Unexpected pipe breaks in municipal water distribution systems may cause isolation of parts of the network or reduction of redundancy, leading to reduced system reliability. While a network with less redundancy implies less tolerance to further breaks, the isolation of nodes explicitly indicates unavailability of the system to service the nodes. This paper presents a method of measuring these topological changes using algebraic connectivity (AC). AC is a parameter that can be used to assess robustness and redundancy of a network. The changes in AC associated with pipe breaks are compared with the AC of intact networks to assess whether the removal of the pipe causes reduction of redundancy or isolation in the network. An AC of 1.5625 × 10 À5 is calculated for an intake of a medium-sized water distribution network (WDN). The fluctuation in AC is used to assess the criticality of each pipe segment to the overall structure of the network. This study also evaluates the failure probability of the WDN, assuming that the network failure probability is equivalent to the probability of isolation of parts of the system due to pipe breaks. The breaks leading to the failure are identified using the method of the minimum cut-sets.
INTRODUCTION
The municipal water distribution network (WDN) is the lifeline of communities. Since potable water is the most essential element for life, a WDN is designed to provide uninterrupted service to community dwellers. For this purpose, the water distribution system (WDS) is designed with an amount of redundancy using looped networks to provide alternative paths for situations if one or more links go out of service. It is, however, difficult to assess all possible paths from the source to the demand points for a municipal WDN containing thousands of demand nodes and pipes.
The performance of the WDS in providing an acceptable level of service to consumers is assessed in terms of system reliability (Tung ) . Over the last few decades, considerable research has focused on system reliability assessments of the WDN. However, no universally accepted definition and measure of system reliability has been used. Wagner et al. () developed analytical methods for system reliability assessment using network connectivity and approachability. Wagner et al. () and Quimpo & Shamsi () incorporated multiple connections from several source nodes to demand nodes for estimating the system reliability.
The connectivity and approachability are defined as the connection of all demand nodes to the source nodes, and the connection of a demand node to its source, respectively. Despite the limitations, the hydraulic-based approach is desired for the design optimization of WDS, since it provides water availability at the demand nodes. On the other hand, for repairing deteriorating water mains in an existing WDN, the pipe breaks causing isolation of part of the system should be given priority. If isolated from the network, the demand nodes will not have any available supply. The focus of the present study is the prioritization of water mains for repair/ maintenance and to identify the pipes and combinations of pipes causing isolation (disconnection) of parts of the WDN. The failure probability of the system is defined as the probability of disconnection. Although breaks of other pipes may also cause water to be unavailable at certain demand nodes due to low pressure, this is not considered here, to avoid computationally expensive hydraulic simulations.
To identify a pipe and combinations of pipes causing isolation, the minimum cut-set method is used. In the conventional minimum cut-set method, pipes causing system failure are rigorously examined, requiring complex and extensive computation. Yannopoulos & Spiliotis () employed graph theory using a connectivity matrix to identify minimum cut-sets. The computational time required in this method is also significantly high, as discussed in more detail in the paper. To overcome this computational limitation, this paper employs complex network analysis (CNA) to find the minimum cut-sets of the network. CNA has been used for the quantification of structural properties of networks and to improve understanding of network The network with higher AC is more robust and more tolerant to the breakage of links. AC provides information on graph partitioning that is closely related to the disconnection of nodes due to pipe breaks (Phan et al. ). Fiedler () pointed out that an event of disconnection in a system would lead to an increase of AC. On the other hand, decrease of AC corresponds to a reduction of redundancy in the network (Phan et al. ). AC has been used to develop a framework to evaluate the redundancy or robustness of WDNs (Fiedler ; Yazdani & Jeffrey ; Phan et al. ) . However, no such comprehensive modelling has ever been performed to take advantage of the characteristics of the AC for network reliability assessment.
The novelty of the current paper is the development of a method for finding minimum cut-sets of complex WDNs using AC. The proposed approach is computationally more efficient than the existing methods of finding minimum cut-sets. A reliability framework is then developed based on AC and the failure probability of pipe components. The proposed method is applied to a real WDN.
RELIABILITY WITH MINIMUM CUT-SETS
This study assumes that network disconnection is equivalent to system failure and is denoted as an event, E. The probability of system failure can be determined using the minimum cut-set approach (Tung ; Yannopoulos & Spiliotis ) . The minimum cut-set is a combination of a minimum number of component failures that lead to system failure (i.e., disconnection, in the current study). If E k is an event of system failure due to a set of k pipes, k ranges from 1 to m-1 where m is the number of pipes in the network, the relationship between event E and events E k can be written as:
(1)
Because the events E k are mutually exclusive, then:
where P E ð Þ is the probability of system failure and P E k ð Þ is the probability of event E k to occur.
pk is defined as the number of minimum cut-sets consisting of k pipes in the network, and event E k is the union of pk events corresponding to pk minimum cut-sets:
E k:pd is the event of the pd th minimum cut-set to occur, where pd ranges from 1 to pk. The relationship of system failure and the event of minimum cut-sets occurring is provided in the fault tree analysis (FTA) diagram shown in Figure 1 .
Here, E k:pd is the intersection of k basic events E k:pd:i
In other words, E k:pd:i is the event of the i th pipe break in the pd th minimum cut-set, and thus:
Equation (4) can be rewritten as:
Figure 1 | FTA of the event of disconnection occurrence in the network.
Since E k:pd:i is the event of an individual pipe breakage, the probability of these basic events can be found directly using the component reliability model.
From Equations (2) and (7), the probability of disconnection (i.e., system failure) in the network can be estimated as:
The failure probability of a simple hypothetical network with its connection of nodes and lengths of pipes as presented in Figure 2 is examined using this approach. For the system failure probability assessment, reliability of the components (the pipes in the current study) in the network is required. Based on these assumptions, the average annual break rate for pipe linking node i and node j (from now on, written as pipe ij) can be found as follows:
where Br is the average annual break rate in the WDN, l total is total length of pipes in the network, l ij is length of pipe ij and λ ij is break rate of pipe ij.
Since the pipe breaking is assumed to be a Poisson process, the annual pipe failure probability can be estimated using an exponential model with a constant failure rate.
This comes from the assumption that the average annual break rate is a constant. Therefore, the component reliability of pipe ij at time t, R ij t ð Þ, is the probability of a pipe to function at a desired level within the period of time [0:t], where:
Thus,
For the hypothetical network in Figure 2 , the average break per year (Br) is randomly chosen as three breaks per year. From Equations (9) and (10), the failure probability of each pipe within 1 month (t ¼ 1/12) is calculated and given in Table 1 . Consequently, the network disconnection probability is found as 0.063 with the details of calculating process given in Table 2 . E 5 (empty) and E 13 (empty) in Table 2 indicate that there are no minimum cut-sets with five and 13 pipes, respectively.
In Table 1 , the pipe is named for the first and second nodes that it links. For example, pipe 5-6 means the pipe connects nodes 5 and 6. The numbers alongside in Figure 2 indicate the assumed geometric length of the corresponding pipe. For example, pipe 5-6 has 2.5 units length. It can be observed from Table 2 that
This is due to the fact that P E h ð Þ requires an intersectional condition for h (i.e., larger than k) simultaneous pipe breaks. Similarly, the intersectional condition indicates the fact that P E kÀ1 ð Þ≪ P E k ð Þ, since the failure probability of each component is less than 1. The difference of P E k ð Þ
and P E h ð Þ is more significant when components P E k:pd:i À Á in Equation (7) are relatively small. The average failure probability, P Br.av , is useful to quantify this difference.
The average failure probability can be obtained by taking the ratio of expected pipe breaks per total number of pipes in the network. This ratio is positively correlated with the breakage probability of the pipe components. Assuming that the pipe break is a Poisson process, the average failure probability within a period Δt can be written as:
where Br is the average annual break rate in the WDN and m is the number of pipes in the network.
If the first component in Equation (2) (i.e., P(E 1 )) significantly overwhelms the summation of the others, then network disconnection probability P E ð Þ can be approxi- 
To investigate the relationship of P Br:av and the difference between P E 1 ð Þ and P E ð Þ, the network in Figure 2 has been investigated by changing the average break (Br) within a fixed period of time, Δt. Figure 3 compares the results. Figure 3 (a) shows that P E ð Þ is very close to P E 1 ð Þ.
This is supported by Figure 3 (b) , in which the ratio between P E 1 ð Þ and P E ð Þ is consistently larger than 0.89. This demonstrates that P E 1 ð Þ accounts for more than 89% of P E ð Þ in all cases. It also implies that the approximation in Equation (13) can be more accurate with small P Br:av . In other words, the smaller the P Br:av , the closer the distance between P E 1 ð Þ and P E ð Þ becomes. It is observed from Figure 3 that P E 1 ð Þ can be used to predict P E ð Þ within an acceptable small value of P Br:av . In the case of a WDN, containing thousands of pipes combining with relatively small Br, the system P Br:av is expected to be small. This leads to the approximation presented in Equation (13) being reasonable.
ALGEBRAIC CONNECTIVITY
One of the major limitations of using the minimum cut-set approach for evaluating the disconnection probability of a large network is the high computational cost needed to determine all minimum cut-sets. Applying the approximation presented in Equation (13), the computational cost can be significantly reduced. The conventional approach to solve the minimum cut-set problem is to count all the paths connecting two different nodes of the network.
Yannopoulos & Spiliotis () used the connectivity matrix from graph theory to record all the paths. If any element of the connectivity matrix is zero, then there is a disconnection between the concerned nodes. Subsequently, the minimum cut-sets are found by removing (idealized for breaking) a set of pipes and recalculating the resulting connectivity matrix. If the connectivity matrix of the breakcontaining network comprises zero elements, then disconnection occurs. However, computational cost of such an approach may be significantly increased when the size of the network is large. In the following sections, the characteristic of the AC is investigated to determine the minimum cutsets for a single pipe break and multiple pipe breaks.
AC for single pipe breaks
AC is a parameter used in graph theory to determine the strength of connection between the nodes in a network.
Mathematically, it is defined as the second smallest Eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of the connected graph (Fiedler ) . Municipal WDNs can be considered as graphs of connected networks, where a number of pipes connect the nodes at their intersections. Then, the graph of WDN can be described as G ¼ G(V,P), where V is a set of n nodes (intersections) and P is a set of m pipes. An adjacent matrix A of G is used to describe the link between the nodes, where:
a ij ¼ 1, if there is a link (pipe) between node i and node j.
a ij ¼ 0, if there is no link (pipe) between node i and node j. The node-degree matrix is a diagonal matrix, which contains the information about the number of connections (node-degree) at each node, and is defined as:
d i ¼ number of connection (node-degree) of node i, where:
Then, the Laplacian matrix is given by Equation (15):
The Laplacian matrix L for the undirected network is usually symmetrical and the sum of rows (and columns) is zero. This characteristic leads to the fact that the first (i.e., smallest) Eigenvalue (λ 1 ) of the matrix is zero, corresponding to the Eigen vector of (1,1, … ,1)
The second smallest Eigenvalue (λ 2 ) of the Laplacian matrix is the AC, which is greater than 0 if G is a connected graph. The Eigenvalues of a network with n nodes of connected graph are:
A network with higher AC implies that the network The separation above is called graph partitioning. In the case of graph partitioning, the AC of the network is a combination of the isolated clusters. Fiedler () mathematically proved that:
where λ 2 G ð Þ is the AC of the connected network, λ 2 G rn ð Þ is the AC of the network after the disconnection with removal of nodes, and λ 2 G rp À Á is the AC of the network after the disconnection with removal of pipes.
The disconnection may be viewed as the direct failure of the network, considering the system failure as the state of not properly serving water to every demand node (i.e., the communities). The reduction of redundancy might lead to the disabling of service to demand nodes, but might not directly result in a network failure event. Thus, the AC will change with the removal of a pipe in the network, where:
• AC will increase if an isolation of nodes occurs, and • AC will decrease if the redundancy is reduced. Now, if the removal of a pipe leads to disconnection of the network (e.g., AC increases), such a pipe is considered as Table 3 ranks 13 events corresponding to the removals of 13 pipes from the network. The difference between AC before and after removal of a pipe is presented in a descending order. There are three events with AC increases, resulting in the network disconnection. These are events 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, with the removals of pipes 5-6, 8-9 and 9-10, respectively. These pipes are the three minimum cutsets that contain only one break corresponding to events E 1.1 , E 1.2 and E 1.3 , shown in Table 2 .
As seen in Figure 2 , the removal of pipes 5-6, 8-9 and 9-10 will result in the disconnection of a node or cluster of nodes. Removal of pipe 5-6 caused the highest increase (i.e., ranked first) since it has high betweenness. Pipe 9-10 has the least increase because the removal of 9-10 leads to the isolation of a single node (node 10). Phan et al. () have concluded from a previous study that the size and number of disconnected clusters greatly affect the increase of the AC.
The other ten events (i.e., event 1.4 to 1.13) in Table 3 show a decrease of the AC with removal of a single pipe, indicating no disconnection. However, the redundancy of the network is decreased, and thus the change in the AC shows a positive correlation to redundancy. Similar observations were reported in previous studies (Yazdani & Jeffrey a, b) . These ten events can further be divided into two groups: the first group consists of events 1.4 to 1.10 with the removal of pipes in Community 1; the second group is the events 1.11 to 1.13 with the removal of pipes in Community 2, which has a higher absolute change in AC (ΔAC) compared to the first group. This difference is due to the fact that Community 2 (with AC ¼ 0.5188) has less redundancy compared to Community 1 (with AC ¼ 2.000).
From the analysis it can be observed that the ΔAC can be used for the following:
1. Identifying the disconnection and reduction of redundancy by observing the sign of ΔAC, where a positive sign (þ) denotes network disconnection and a negative sign (À) indicates reduction of redundancy.
2. Identifying the components causing most significant disconnection based on the highest positive ΔAC. 
where AA is the adjacent matrix A (see Equation (14)) with the removal of the concerned pipe or set of pipes.
Since the computational cost of multiplying two matrices with size n × n is O(n 3 ) for a naive algorithm, the compu- Table 2 ) or increase (e.g., E 2.1 in Table 2 ), depending on the network structure. If ΔAC decreases, it may fail to recognize the disconnection. This is further demonstrated below through application of the hypothetical network in Figure 2 . Table 4 presents the ACs for all possible minimum cutsets of the network shown in Figure 2 . In Table 4 , minimum cut-set E 2.3 leads to disconnection of node 7; however, the change in AC is negative. Thus, the ΔAC-based method would fail to identify E 2.3 . This phenomenon is termed herein as 'noise'. The reason for the negative ΔAC is that the increase of AC due to disconnection of node 7 is less than the decrease of AC due to loss of redundancy. Note that all of the pipes within the set of a minimum cut-set have to break simultaneously to cause disconnection of the network or to increase the AC. Removal of only one pipe from the set does not lead to disconnection or an increase in AC. Thus, the AC of a network with removal of a pipe from the set of a minimum cut-set is always lower than the AC of the network with removal of all pipes in the minimum cut-set. This characteristic can be used to eliminate the noise, as discussed below.
To implement this, when ΔAC decreases with a set of b breaks, the AC of the network is calculated with removal of each of the pipes within the set, i.e., AC u * for removing u
. If the largest AC u * is less than the AC with removal of the full set of pipes, then disconnection occurs.
For example, removal of the set of pipes 6-7 and 6-8 causes a negative ΔAC value in Table 4 , with an AC of 0.1823. The
AC of the network with the break of pipes 6-8 and 6-7
(AC 1 * and AC 2 *) are 0.1341 and 0.1672, respectively. These two values are lower than the AC of the event E 2.3 (0.1823).
Therefore, the set of pipes 6-7 and 7-8 is a minimum cutset that leads to disconnection. In this manner, the noise removal is applied to the network (Figure 2 ) and the minimum cut-sets of the network based on the change in AC are successfully determined and tabulated in Table 4 .
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT USING AC
The exact solution of the network disconnection probability can be obtained theoretically by rigorously examining the minimum cut-sets using FTA, discussed above. However, this process requires tedious and complex computations for a large-scale network. Therefore, a practical approach is required, using assumptions to overcome the difficulties.
This section develops a framework to estimate network disconnection probability based on the change of AC. It was revealed earlier in this paper that a single event-based failure probability provides a reasonable approximation of the system failure probability (i.e., P E ð Þ ≈ P E 1 ð Þ). Both single event-based and multiple event-based failure probabilities are considered here for the AC-based reliability assessment.
For the failure probability of the pipe components, a constant failure rate-based model, a failure function (i.e., exponential function) and Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) are considered.
Single event-based approximate failure probability
When the pipe breaking is assumed as a Poisson process with a constant failure rate, which depends on the length of the components, the mean pipe failure rate of a component can be related to the length of the component using Equation (9). It can be expressed for the minimum cut-set containing one pipe as:
where l 1:pd is the length of pipe corresponding to the pd th minimum cut-set containing only one pipe.
Approximating P(E) ≈ P (E 1 ), as described in Equation (13), the failure probability of the system can be defined as:
Substituting Equation (19) with Equation (20):
For a group of pipes with minimum cut-set, the total length of the group is given by:
Using the length of the group of pipes, the failure probability of the system can be defined as:
However, the pipe breaking is not necessarily a Poisson process with or without a constant failure rate. Particularly, the WDN is a system containing a mixture of pipes ranging from newly installed segments to wear-out segments. The agedependent degradation of WDN pipe segments is an unavoidable mechanism, because these structures are exposed directly to a hazardous environment, leading to corrosion and cracking. Once a pipe is at its wear-out stage, the assumption of a constant break rate may no longer be adequate. The degrading pipe segments would need a more precise failure function with sufficient input data to describe the failure process with an increasing failure probability. For any other component failure model, the failure probability of the system can be defined based on the assumption of P(E) ≈ P(E 1 ) as:
A detailed failure probability estimation procedure using either Poisson process-based failure functions or any other failure functions is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Multiple event-based failure probability Figure 5 illustrates the detailed procedure of of calculating system failure probability considering rigorous multiple events (i.e., minimum cut-sets). As discussed earlier, 'noise' may appear in the failure probability assessment for minimum cut-set containing multiple pipes. Thus, there can be some disconnection events with negative ΔAC. A sub-algorithm ( Figure 5 ) discussed in the section 'AC for multiple pipe breaks' can be applied to avoid the noise problem. For calculation of failure probability of the components, application of a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is used.
The methods discussed above are applied to the network presented in Figure 2 through development of codes using Matlab R software. The calculated failure probabilities are compared in Figure 6 . For the failure function, an equivalent exponential model is considered for illustration. The failure probability based on rigorous investigation of the network using FTA (without the use of AC) is also calculated and included in the figure. Among AC-based methods, the approximate failure probabilities calculated using a Poisson processbased and exponential component failure model are the same in Figure 6 , since equivalent reliability models are used for the components. In the developed framework, different reliability models can be used (e.g., Weibull or lognormal distribution)
instead of an exponential model, if the distribution is known.
The MC simulation conducted using 10,000 trials each time provides multiple event-based failure probabilities, which is very close to the failure probabilities calculated using single event-based approximation. Note that the MC simulation without the 'noise' removal sub-algorithm fails to predict the failure probability ( Figure 6 ).
Figure 4 | Flow chart for single event-based approximate failure probability (P(E) ≈ P(E1)).
In Figure 6 , the failure probability calculated using the FTA and AC methods is not significantly different. The network disconnection probability reaches close to 100% after 26 months, according to the rigorous FTA solution. The AC-based method with reliability algorithms predicts the failure probability as 97% (after 26 months).
A CASE STUDY OF THE CITY OF MOUNT PEARL
The developed method is applied to the network in the city of Mount Pearl, which is a community with a population of approximately 25,000. The water main system contains 130 km of pipe network (see schematic shown in Figure 7 ).
Thus, on average, 192 people are served by each kilometre of water main, which is comparable to common WDNs in the USA and Canada, which serve 164 people per kilometre (Folkman ) . Diameters of the pipes in the city range from 150 to 600 mm. Water is bought from St
John's -a neighbour city -to two water tanks located at the north (S1) and south-west (S2) parts of the city. The WDS to support the entire city is based on gravity flow.
The locations of the sources are ignored in this study, for simplification. However, they could be useful for further study, which defines system failure as the disconnection of the source to nodes or reachability of the network. A sample of a raw database for the network is presented in (Table 5 ).
This pipe system generally comprises ductile iron (91%), cast iron pipe (5%) and other materials (4%). Based on the annual water main break records of the city, the annual break rate is 6.931 breaks/year/100 km. This break rate is comparable to the average break rate of 6.77 breaks/year/ 100 km reported in Folkman (). It is understood that the break rate based on limited records is not sufficient for failure assessment, but is acceptable for the purpose of illustration. 
Identification of the critical pipes
For identification of critical pipes using AC, the pipes can be ranked according to the change in AC (ΔAC) with and without removal of a pipe from the network. Sample results of ranking of the pipes in the city of Mount Pearl's WDN are presented in Table 7 . The histogram of the ΔAC is presented in Figure 8 .
According to Table 7 . This sudden jump in ΔAC marks the most critical pipes, the failures of which would lead to an overall structural change in the network (i.e., disconnection on a large scale). Group 2 does not contain such outliers.
Even though Group 2 has no outliers, it is helpful to understand the reduction of redundancy on a macro scale. To investigate the groups of pipes further, a set of the top 50 ranked pipes from Group 1 is analysed in more detail. The most important pipes of Group 2 (first 100 ranked pipes)
have also been analysed, as illustrated in Figure 9 .
The critical pipes in the network are also identified using the shortest path (SP) method for comparison. In the SP method, the shortest path to all pairs of nodes within the network is investigated. The method is thus computationally more demanding than the AC-based method. A pipe component appearing in the highest number of the shortest path is considered to be most critical, since water is expected to flow through this pipe component to a maximum number of destinations. The pipes are therefore ranked according to the number of their appearances on the shortest paths. The pipes with higher rank are considered to be more critical. Figure 10 shows the top 100 highest ranked pipes (thick solid lines) in the city of Mount Pearl's network. method cannot be applied to identify the pipes that may lead to network disconnections.
It can be seen that the top ranked pipes based on the ΔAC (Figure 9 ) matched well with the shortest path results presented in Figure 10 . Thus, the ΔAC could effectively classify the critical pipes in Group 1 and Group 2. The ranked ΔAC table can also be used to identify the alternate path of connecting two points, which cannot be obtained from the shortest path method.
Estimating the system disconnection probability Disconnection probability of the city of the Mount Pearl WDN is analysed using the methods discussed above. The results are presented in Table 8 and Figure 11 . Time periods of 1, 2, 6 and 12 months are used in the analysis. From Table 8 , it can be seen that the P Br.av of the network is significantly low compared with the example in Figure 2 .
Thus, the calculated failure probabilities using the single 
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Threshold for random removal of node event-based approach and the multiple event-based approach are almost the same in Figure 11 .
CONCLUSIONS
In an existing WDS, pipe breaks causing isolation of part of the system should be avoided, to provide uninterrupted service to the dwellers. Studying the disconnection probability of WDS is therefore important for optimizing repair/maintenance prioritization planning. A pipe or combination of pipes causing network isolation can be identified using the minimum cut-sets method. In the conventional minimum cut-set method, pipes causing system failure (i.e., isolation)
are rigorously examined to determine a combination of the minimum number of components' failure leading to the system failure. The process of finding minimum cut-sets is very complex and requires extensive computation. This paper presents a method of finding minimum cut-sets using For the events with multiple pipe breaks, some breaks might cause an increase in AC while others might cause a decrease in AC, resulting in a 'noisy' situation. A methodology is developed to eliminate the 'noise' for multiple pipe breaks through scrutinizing the pipes in the minimum cutsets. A failure probability estimation framework is developed using the AC-based minimum cut-sets. The proposed method employs removal of pipes one by one from the network and subsequent estimation of the change in AC (ΔAC) for estimating the network failure probability and ranking pipes within the network according to their importance level. Based on these steps, the critical pipes in the network can be identified. The suitability of the proposed method is demonstrated through application, first to a simple hypothetical network and then to a medium-sized real WDS. The study reveals that the single event-based approximate failure probability can reasonably be used for system probability assessment, saving extensive computational time. The critical and high betweenness pipes identified using the AC-based method are validated through comparison with the results of the SP method.
The SP method is a distance-related measurement in CNA, which is useful for identifying high betweenness pipes or nodes (Newman ). However, the SP method cannot be used for identification of network isolation.
The proposed reliability model considers the probability of disconnection only. Hydraulic availability of the demand nodes is not considered. Thus, lower bound values of the system failure probability are obtained. The developed 
